A full decade ago, Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjø´rgo (1998) introduced their volume Nation and race with a brief discussion of an emerging trend: the 'unprecedented convergence' of American and European right-wing movements. If anything, these linkages have proliferated and morphed into something much more substantial since that time. While one of the contributors to that volume (Weinberg) questioned the nascent transformation and unification at the time, there is little room for such doubt today. It is surprising, then, that so little attention has been paid to the globalization of the hate movement via the Internet in the intervening years. To be sure, scholars have addressed the use of the Net by white supremacists. But these analyses have largely been confined to relatively simple descriptions or content analyses of the sites. Thus, we join a small field of writers such as Les Back and Phyllis Gerstenfeld, for example, who explicitly consider the extent and implications of the World Wide Web for 'White Pride World Wide '. In what follows, we provide some introductory statements on the concepts of 'cyber cultures' and 'virtual communities' before moving on to more concretely explore the online communities that have emerged around otherwise diverse *Corresponding author. Email: Barbara.Perry@uoit.ca collectives devoted to both real world and cyberhate. In particular, we are concerned with the ways in which Internet capacities allow the development of an identifiable global white supremacist community.
Virtual communities
There are competing interpretations of the importance of cyber communication for identity construction and transformation. On the one hand are those who claim that cyberspace allows, in fact makes inevitable, the fragmentation of identity. That is, ongoing engagement with cyber worlds allows 'rapid alterations of identity' by which individuals cycle through different characters, genders, races, sexualities and other assorted identities (Turkle, 1995, p. 174 ; see also Stone, 1995; Poster, 1996) . From this perspective, users form and reform identities -often false -at random. Yet what such accounts fail to acknowledge is the simultaneous way in which 'other subaltern publics might be formulating more fixed identities via the Web' (McPherson, 2000, p. 129) . In other words, alongside these segregating or fragmenting tendencies, interaction in cyberspace also allows for the development of community. In contrast to the centrifugal forces suggested by the former accounts, these collectivist analyses point to centripetal tendencies which allow otherwise diasporic members to find a common space.
This latter conception is very much in line with the likes of Rheingold (2000) who popularized the phrase 'virtual community' in the 1990s. Rheingold held to a utopian, perhaps e-topian vision in which communities tied by values, interests and sociability would thrive on the Internet. Similarly, while he goes on to challenge it, John Mided shares his understanding of the virtual community:
A virtual community is a community of people who have never met, who may be hiding behind false identities and who may meet in spaces that don't exist in substance. The strength of virtual communities is summed up as follows: 'Experientially, community within cyberspace emphasizes a community of interests, usually bounded by the topic under discussion, that can lead to communal spirit and apparent social bonding' (Fernback and Thompson, 1997) . (2000, p. 70) These are 'imagined communities' of the sort described by Benedict Anderson (2006, p. 6) , where the members may never meet or even be in proximity to one another, yet 'in the minds of each lives the image of their communities'.
In his book, The Internet galaxy, Manuel Castells (2001) concludes that technological systems are socially produced and that social production is culturally informed. What Castells in fact implies is that the culture of the producers of the Internet have also contributed to shape the medium in the beginning, in view of the fact that the producers were indeed the actual users. The Internet is in constant change and new socio-technological inventions are in many cases also the source for the growth of new enterprises that are trying to meet the growing demands on the global market.
The Internet culture according to Castells is a collective construction that transcends individual preferences while influencing the practices of people in the culture. Castells develops his ideas and identifies the Internet culture as being characterized by a four layer structure:
(1) the techno-meritocratic culture; (2) the hacker culture; (3) the virtual communitarian culture; and (4) the entrepreneurial culture.
These four layers contribute to an ideology of freedom that is prevalent on the Internet and 'should not be recognized as the founding culture since it does not interact directly with the development of the technological system' (Castells, 2001, p. 37) . If we try to analyze this four layer structure in relation to the Internet culture we understand that freedom has many uses and that these cultural layers, in Castells words, are hierarchically disposed. Castells continues, saying that the techno-meritocratic culture becomes specified as a hacker culture by building rules and customs into networks of cooperation aimed at technological projects while the virtual communitarian culture, due to its character, contributes a social dimension to technological sharing in the sense that it brings social interaction and symbolic belonging to the Internet. The fourth layer, the entrepreneurial culture is, according to Castells, working 'on top of the hacker culture, and on the communitarian culture, to diffuse Internet practices in all domains of society by way of money-making' (Castells, 2001, p. 37) . The different layers are consequently dependent on each other in order to operate and of course to survive.
What is of interest to us is the virtual communitarian culture, for it is possible to understand the online white supremacist 'community' as an illustration of this model. Castells (2001) understands the communitarian culture to be both a source and creation of values and social organization. Rather than emphasize the technological elements of the Internet, communitarian cultures shape the social and cultural milieu of the Internet (Castells, 2001, p. 53) . From this perspective, the Internet 'lays the foundation for self-directed networking as a tool for organization, collective action, and the construction of meaning' (Castells, 2001, p. 55) .
It is intriguing that many scholars who examine the Net from a communitarian perspective have tended to focus on the democratizing tendencies of virtual communication. They emphasize the ways in which New Social Movements, in particular, have exploited the Web for progressive activism and messaging. Castells (2001, p. 54) claims that these e-topian analyses liken virtual communities to the communes of the 1960s -democratic, inclusive, and communal in the most idyllic sense. However, with the likes of Bostdorff (2004) and Zickmund (1997) , Castells also draws attention to the less benevolent social movements and their use of all the Internet has to offer, such that 'in this context, community is built through opposition to other groups, and through angry, persistent messages of hate that discourage dissenting points of view' (Bostdorff, 2004, p. 340) . Few have been so eager to pursue the development of a hostile virtual community as the white supremacist hate movement.
Cyberhate
While many purveyors of hate are content to spread their rhetoric of intolerance in the 'real' community, there are those who prefer to hold their conversations in 'cyber space' or in the context of 'virtual communities'. In conjunction with the globalization of technology there has been a notable increase of online hate groups and cyberhate related activities on the Internet. Vilified people and groups are targeted directly through text messages, emails, blogs etc., often containing malicious threats, or indirectly in forums, virtual communities or chat groups. Hate groups have taken the opportunity to reach out with their destructive message on the Internet, which serves their purposes due to the nature of the Internet. This phenomenon reflects society as a whole and is nothing specific for the Internet. We have to remember that technological systems are socially produced and that social production is culturally informed and that the Internet is not an exception in this context (Castells, 2001) . Technology is created and utilized 'in particular times and places which produces social effects that taken together possess a technosocial quality' (Back, 2002, p. 633) . Moreover, the specificity of technologies and their content, uses, etc. 'is made possible by the form itself, along with the historical forces that put it to work' (Back, 2002, p. 633) . Here, of course, we are interested in the electronic medium and messages by which far-flung adherents and sympathizers of the racist hate movement seek to build 'White Pride World Wide'.
The emergence of hate-oriented and 'White Power' sites has occurred at such a rate that it is virtually impossible to estimate the number of such websites. Such counting is made even more difficult by the fact that sites move and shut down on a frequent basis, often resurfacing on other servers with other names. Nonetheless, monitoring organizations have tried to quantify the problem. One 2005 estimate, from the Simon Wiesenthal Center suggested that there were more than 5,000 websites advocating hatred at that time. A 2005 International Network Against Cyber Hate publication reported that 'during the last four years, INACH members handled about 15,000 cases of online hate' (p. 7) among its network of 14 member organizations. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of such estimates. What monitors and scholars can agree on, however, is that the number of such sites has vastly increased over the past decade. As early as 1997, the Anti-Defamation League (1997) warned of the spread of 'Hi-Tech Hate', warning that the number had doubled in recent years, to over 250! Anecdotally, when Perry (1998) Consistent with the shifting demographics (i.e. middle class) and sophistication of the hate movement (Perry, 2000) , then, is an increasing willingness to take advantage of the Internet as a tool both for recruitment and unification. Traditionally, the primary means by which hate groups recruited members or spread their message of intolerance have been by word of mouth, or by pamphleteering. However, several current factors have combined to change this. On the one hand, cheaper, faster and more accessible means of transmission and communication have emerged -text messaging and computer based communication to name just two. On the other hand, hate group leadership has become much more sophisticated to the extent that they are in a position to take advantage of these developing technologies.
The hate movement has been blessed with a novel marketing gift in the form of the Internet. This particular form of communication is superior to all others as a means of widely and quickly disseminating hate propaganda. Computers have become increasingly affordable. At the very least, they can be easily accessed through work, local schools, universities and colleges. Websites are easily and cheaply maintained. Best of all, from the perspective of hate groups, the Net remains unregulated. In short, readiness and ability to exploit the Internet ensures effective communication between current and potential movement membership, which, according to McAdam (1982) is also vital to movement solidarity.
A special ADL (1997) report entitled Hi-tech hate: Extremist use of the Internet, directs attention to the used of the Internet by hate mongers:
As computers become less expensive, simpler to use and consequently more common in American homes (and workplaces), as the barriers to disseminating information through computers fall, bigots of all kinds are rushing to use the power of modern technology to spread their propaganda. (ADL, 1997, p. 3)
The origins of 'Cyberhate' by the organized hate movement are generally traced to white supremacist Donald Black. Black became proficient at using the computer while serving time for conspiracy to overthrow the government of Dominica. Upon release, he put his new skills to work by creating a webpage, Stormfront, in 1995. Black refers to his home-page as the 'White Nationalist Resource Page', or alternatively, as:
. . . a resource for those courageous men and women fighting to preserve their White Western culture, ideals and freedom of speech and association -a forum for planning strategies and forming political and social groups to ensure victory. (Stormfront, online) The site includes news items, letters, the Canadian White Racialist magazine Up Front, neo-Nazi graphics and symbols, current and archived 'articles of interest to White Nationalists', mailing lists, newsgroups, and electronic bulletin boards. In addition, it provides links to a myriad of other White Nationalist sites.
For many who may encounter these web-pages, the ideas and images are antithetical to their understanding of western ideals of democracy and equality. As such, they are quickly dismissed. Yet for others, they reinforce or implant tolerance and hostility. Thus, those with embedded biases may find affirmation on the Net. Others -uncertain about 'American' or 'Swedish' or 'Aryan' identity, or feeling dislocated by economic or cultural change -may find a pre-packaged answer to their questions.
Whether couched in the pseudo-scientific arguments of holocaust deniers, or the more virulent messages of Donald Black or Aryan Nations, cyberhate is a powerful force. It goes largely unregulated and unchallenged. Given the reification of technology in this culture, those who access computer based sites often take the data and arguments for literal truth. We have encouraged our youth to use this resource, to become Net-literate, without necessarily reminding them that what appears on-line is not all fair, accurate, or favorable. This is not at all unsatisfying to the hate groups: This is the hope of the haters: use the media to create an alternative channel to spread the word, to reach the impressionable, reinforce the beliefs of the converted, and create a community of the like-minded. On the Web, they preach on an easy-to-use, powerful and far-reaching platform that confers special legitimacy and filters out opponents. (ADL, 1997, p. 34) It is this conferring of legitimacy that makes the use of the 'Net by hate groups particularly troubling. It places the rhetoric of these groups on an equal footing with all other forms of discourse. It confers validity on the messages delivered, in spite of their potential harm to the groups demonized in the electronic literature. It places the rhetoric of these groups on an equal footing with all other forms of discourse. Moreover, as the above quote suggests, the use of the Internet enhances communication between the 'converted', that is, within the movement itself. This is vitally important in light of the global diversity within the hate movement.
Strengthening the global movement
While there are obvious points of convergence across the various Klan groups, or identity churches, or skinhead organizations, the hate movement has historically been varied and, in fact, fractured. Excluding militia groups, Kleg (1993) suggests that it is possible to identify five distinct categories of hate groups operative in the 1990s: identity church adherents; neo-Nazis; skinheads; Ku Klux Klansmen/women; and Posse Comitatus. One might also add to this list Holocaust Deniers. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the distinction between these groups are becoming increasingly blurred -membership is fluid, with people moving in and out of groups, and maintaining memberships in several at once. Moreover, there is considerable and increasing interaction and co-operation between groups in terms of rallies, information sharing, and links on hate lines, for instance. Internet communication facilitates the creation of the collective identity that is so important to movement cohesiveness (McAdam, 1982) . As a recent Klanwatch (1998, p. 25) report observes, increasing reliance on email, webpages and electronic chat rooms 'give(s) racists an empowering sense of community. Even lone racists, with no coreligionists nearby, feel they are part of a movement'.
Internet communication knows no national boundaries. Consequently, it allows the hate movement to extend its collective identity internationally, thereby facilitating a potential 'global racist subculture' (Back, Keith & Solomos, 1998) . There is no reason to assume that processes of globalization affecting commerce, politics and demographics do not also affect the realm of identity politics played out by the hate movement (Weinberg, 1998) . Weinberg (1998, p. 79) argues that the Internet will in fact provide the vehicle for the construction of a 'common racial identity reaching across the Atlantic'. Regardless of national affiliation, Internet communication allows white people across the globe to share in the celebration of a common race.
To our minds, in order to make a case for the emerging globalization of a virtual community of hate, we must establish two conditions: extensive international connections; and something resembling a 'community'. As to the first, as number of recent studies have uncovered evidence of the 'sort of global linkages that an Adolph Hitler would only have envied' (Theismeyer, 1999, p. 117 ). An initial indicator of the multinational membership of hate blogs, sites, etc. is that many include multilingual 'services', most commonly in English, French, German, and some Scandinavian languages. In addition, such sites tend to exploit (white) multi-cultural symbols drawn from Nordic, Celtic or Nazi mythology. Moreover, visitors to various on line forums are drawn from all corners of the world. Michael Whine (2004) More systematic efforts to assess the internationalization of the hate movement on the Net have recently been conducted, and they lend credence to our position. Gerstenfeld, Grant and Chiang (2003) surveyed 157 extremist websites. Among their findings is the observation that 80 of the sites -51% -included links to international organizations; of those sites that had any external links (126), 63.7% allowed e-connections with international organizations. Specifically, Ku Klux Klan and Christian Identity sites were most likely to fall in this category. Interestingly, onethird of the 'nationalist' sites contained international links. A smaller but still sizable proportion -26.1% -had non-English content. Not surprisingly, these were most likely to be Holocaust denial and neo-Nazi sites. Gerstenfeld et al.'s (2003) study provides some hints that the hate movement is beginning to knit a global web. A somewhat more methodical social network analysis by Burris, Smith and Strahm (2000) provides even deeper insight into these e-connections. Looking at websites alone -not bulletin boards, chat rooms, etc. -they found that 'more than two-thirds of links within the white supremacist network connect sites in different countries ' (p. 232) . This was especially the case for skinheads -mainly Scandinavian and American -and Klan and Aryan Nation sites.
In brief, the Internet facilitates global communication and the exchange of information and rhetoric. It creates a virtual space where homologous if not homogeneous sentiments of racial love and hate can be freely and widely shared without fear of contradiction. So, there is a strong suggestion that white supremacists across the globe are increasingly reaching out to one another across the ether. But does this connection in cyberspace necessarily imply, then, a 'virtual community?' We turn to Wellman's definition of community to guide our assessment: 'networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging, and social identity' (cited in Castells, 2001, p. 127) . For members of the hate movement, it is the latter three dimensions that come to the fore. 'Support' is offered to the extent that users typically find their views reinforced and mirrored by others, rather than challenged by anti-racist sentiments. Sociability is similarly important in so much as users find themselves able to freely communicate racist, or sexist, or other sorts of views that might be unpalatable in other contexts. There are, in fact, multiple e-venues that users can access for purely social purposes. There are 'community forums' that allow ongoing threads exploring and discussing not just white supremacist ideals, but culture, arts, etc. Stormfront's 'White Nation Community' board, for example, includes forums on poetry, culture and customs, health and fitness, and homemaking in addition to the expected forums on ideology and philosophy, and revisionism (http://www.stormfront.org/forum/). Many sites also include 'singles pages'. Again Stormfront is a good example, with its 'Talk' and 'Dating Advice' forums. The Aryan Dating Page (http://www.adp. fptoday.com) is another intriguing example of the use of the Internet to connect 'romantically' within the white supremacist movement.
As noted, the Internet is especially crucial to right-wing adherents to the extent that the relevant websites provide 'information, a sense of belonging, and social identity'. We think there is telling evidence of these dimensions as well, in terms of the convergence of 'mythic ideals' and especially appeals to one nation, or White Pride WorldWide. Granted, virtual hate groups are no more homogeneous than their 'real world' counterparts; they too are characterized by the same fractures and divisions. The movement, generally, is rather fractured but the glue that nonetheless holds it together is its ideological core, and the vision of the common identity that this imparts. Stormfront's banner White Pride Worldwide epitomizes this global nationalist identity, so that 'the rhetoric of whiteness becomes the means to combine profoundly local grammars of racial exclusion within a trans-local and international reach that is made viable through digital technology' (Back, 2002, p. 633) . Internet communication helps to close the social and spatial distance that might otherwise thwart efforts to sustain a collective identity. Given the geographical dispersal of hate groups across the country, and the globe, the medium of cyberspace allows members in Maine, and Mississippi as well as Munich, Toronto and Oslo to engage in real time conversations, to share the ritual and imagery that bind the individuals to the collective without having to travel great distances or incur great costs. Digital communication allows them to form 'reimagined social configurations' (Fernback, 1997, p. 39) . Virtual conversations and ready access to webpages aggressively asserting the shortcomings of the Other strengthen the resolve of individual members by creating the framework for a shared sense of both peril and purpose. Such sites provide at least the fac¸ade of cohesion and collective security, but even more importantly for isolated and atomized members, a collective vision of shared fears, values, and ideologies.
The kinds of 'information' that are accessible are presented as the truth, as distinct from the lies and subterfuge of Jews, race traitors, and liberals. Extremist sites offer up the supposed justifications for racial love and hate, and especially of racial superiority. Thus, for example, the National Alliance (http://www.natvan. com/) insists on distinguishing between that which is 'wholesome and natural', i.e. white Christian heterosexuality, and its opposite, that which is 'degenerate and alien'. As this example illustrates, it is apparent that many of the identified ideologies are constructed upon essentializing dualisms: Us versus Them; good versus evil; strong versus weak; superior versus inferior. Moreover, these dualities are interpreted as inherent in the groups in question, and therefore a legitimate foundation for the marginalization of the 'Other', who is consistently the negative and subordinate half of the equation. The whole array of 'ideologies of power' that Perry (2000; has addressed at length elsewhere are to be found on the Web, as tools of education and recruitment. This is vitally important to the establishment of a global community of hate.
At first glance, it seems paradoxical that those coming together through the Internet should be characterized as white nationalists. They pledge allegiance to particular nation states: Sweden, Germany, the United States, for example. Each refers to their imagined nation as the great white homeland. However, on the Web, otherwise diverse nationalists pledge a more profound allegiance to the mythic white nation. One American posted this message to Stormfront's European Discussion Forum:
. . . defending the country where i was born, i would rather defend the country where my bloodline comes from, that way i would be defending my grandfathers and grandmothers as well as my culture, there is no culture in america its mtv and mcdonalds. Germany the fatherland and my heart.
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As this suggests, online extremists idealize a common lineage, traceable to white Aryan cultures of Western Europe. Indeed, 'in place of their countries of birth, these activists sought to construct a new national identity based on race and a perception of shared history, culture and values' (Kaplan and Bjorgo, 1998, p. x) . The American based National Alliance reminds the faithful that:
Each of us is a member of the Aryan (European) race, which, like other races, developed its special characteristics over many thousands of years during which natural selection not only adapted it to its environment but also advanced it along its evolutionary path.
A similar claim is made by the longest-lived white supremacist group, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK):
Our main and fundamental objective is the Maintenance of the Supremacy of the White Race in this Republic. History and physiology teach us that we belong to a race which nature has endowed with an evident superiority over all other races, and that the Maker in thus elevating us above the common standard of human creation has intended to give us over inferior races a domination from which no human laws can permanently derogate. (cited in Sapp, Holden and Wiggins, 1993, pp. 123-124) There are no limits to the perception of the superiority of the white race. Whites assume their proper and natural place at the top of the pyramid because of the diversity of their talents. They are masters of all things creative and moral. An American Renaissance (online) magazine article claims that in 'intelligence, law-abidingness, sexual restraint, academic performance, resistance to disease -whites can be considered ''superior'' to blacks'. Particular emphasis is often placed on the creative genius of the white race -hence, White Pride World Wide. Progress -narrowly defined as technical and technological advances -is argued to be derived from European innovation and intelligence. It is those of European descent who are responsible for the current shape of 'civilization'. The Aryan group ALPHA (online) makes the claim that, historically:
. . . breakthroughs and advances were made, if not entirely then predominantly, by White men and their abilities. All other races hung on our coattails, learning from us but never leading our people.
William Pierce, in an American Dissident Voices article, echoes this belief, saying that the 'vital spark I'm talking about, the genius for order, the spirit of progress which built our civilization, is European'.
It is from this supremacist vision that the hate movement derives its rhetoric of self love -as opposed to the racial hatred that has so long been a trademark of the movement. Consequently, KKK Grand Wizard Thomas Robb, for example, asserted that Klan leaders would be 'taught to avoid statements that sound hateful and turn people off' (cited in Kleg, 1993, p. 216) . He and others of like mind speak of love of the white race, rather than hatred of others, of preservation of a way of life, and other such mantras. In their search for respectability, some hate groups have rejected explicitly racist terms for more 'subtle' code words which act as proxies for traditional rhetoric. Primary among these is the assurance that they don't hate blacks, or Jews, or gays; rather they love their own white race. ZOG becomes 'government interference', White Christian becomes 'average citizen;' cross-burnings become 'illuminations'; African Americans become 'welfare cheaters'. Don Black, for example, eschews the pejorative connotations of 'racist' in favor of the term 'White Nationalist'. The cross-national appeal of this approach is evident in the following 'ad' featured on the National Alliance website:
The National Alliance is proud to announce that its world-famous 'Love Your Race' annual flier distribution campaign -centered around Valentine's Day -is currently under preparation. Every year, the Alliance and its allies around the world distribute vast numbers of a simple and beautiful flier which encourages people to 'Love Your Race'. This flier, original to the Alliance, is possibly one of the best known and most easily recognized pro-White leaflets in the world. You can do your part in this campaign by downloading a pdf copy and running them off yourself: Click on the link here. Don't forget that the international nature of our outreach campaign is, as always, never forgotten, and the flier is available in Afrikaans; Albanian; Bulgarian; Czech; Danish; Dutch; Estonian; Finnish; French; Gaeilge; German; Greek; Icelandic; Italian; Latvian; Lithuanian; Macedonian; Maltese; Norwegian; Polish; Portuguese; Romanian; Russian; Serbian; Spanish; and Swedish at this link here (http://www.natallnews.com/ page.php?id¼23).
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Imagine a world swathed in white supremacist fliers -like the maypole on May 1, the symbolic gesture represents a rallying point for like-minded supremacists worldwide.
Global response?
Typically, many western nations have attempted to respond to cyberhate and related Internet phenomena through legal regulation. However, as we know, law enforcement must scurry to catch up with the transgressions that are occurring in the backwaters of the process. Legislators are passing new laws to address online based criminal activities; police agencies are forming special computer crime units; and police officers are being trained to become fluent with information technology. The law enforcement landscape has had to change to come into line with the demands of the evolution of communication technologies.
The traditional criminal activities that are found in the non-virtual world are also found online, which obviously makes it twice as hard in relation to resources for the law enforcement to maintain the same standards. Cybercrime generally refers to criminal offenses committed using the Internet or another computer network as a component of the crime and the range of criminal offenses is as broad as in the non virtual world. Cybercrime can basically be described as a criminal activity committed on the Internet whether it is against another individual(s), business, property or the State (Shinder Littlejohn, 2002, p. 5) . Cyberhate is but one aspect of this broader phenomenon, and may perhaps be even more difficult to control since it is not necessarily 'criminal' activity in the strictest sense of the term.
We have established in this paper the increasing rates of web-based hate involving harassment, bullying, discrimination or other degrading treatment of people. Computers, online communities, and networks are being used as a means by which to communicate hate related messages to and about certain individuals. The possibility of being anonymous when harassing or expressing hatred against individuals or groups has certainly made it easier for some individuals to continue with their unlawful or disrespectful online activities. Cybercrime as an evolving field has transformed the legal landscape and jurisdiction presents a problem in cybercrime cases considering that the criminal activity is by definition committed in cyberspace, which is abstract and not a physical place as previously discussed. The person behind the crime and the victim are often miles apart, and the criminal might never have set foot in the country or region where the harm occurs (Shinder Littlejohn, 2001, p. 5) .
Law has, more often than not, been considered as the conventional strategy of the state to control and maintain social order within its domains and as an instrument to effectively promote and uphold regulations. However, laws and legal institutions have to a large extent been based on geographic boundaries and physical space. If we, for conceptual purposes, understand law as a system of rules, the interaction between law and society has until recently been both fairly straightforward and based on customs, traditions, geographical boundaries and physical space (Arthurs and Kreklewich, 1996, p. 16) .
In the beginning of the 1990s we experienced a punctuation of the legal equilibrium when a new dimension was introduced, the Internet. The long term stability within the legal domain came abruptly to an end, requiring new approaches to meet the different demands and changes that were taking place. Legal disputes and dilemmas with different characters that we were used to see, started to appear as outcomes of new behaviors in regards to IT-related business transactions, online banking, various forms of personal interactions on the Internet, electronic communication, etc. The disposition of the conflicts was by no means new but how to decide on where they should be resolved was not as easy to determine considering that some of the cases could involve different countries, legal cultures and policies.
The legal dilemmas that have arisen lately present tremendous challenges for the legal structures across the globe; and, since people are becoming more inclined to interact with different settings around the world, there is a need for harmonizing legal systems in order to comply with the new evolving patterns of retail. These problems are fairly new in a historical perspective. The ever-increasing use of information systems and networks has gradually resulted in a more interconnected world with all the positive aspects it entails but we have also been confronted with new-fangled societal issues, which consequently have created new demands on the legal system. As discussed in a recent UN publication The law of cyber space, computer networks are now considered to be vital components in most societal systems:
. . . and support critical infrastructures such as energy, transportation, and banking and finance, and play a major part in how companies do business, how governments provide services to citizens and enterprises, and how people communicate and exchange information. The number and nature of technologies has multiplied and will continue to grow, as has the nature, volume, and sensitivity of information that is moving from place to place. At the same time, these information systems and networks are being exposed to a growing variety of new threats. Electronic commerce and the marketplace cannot thrive without strong and safe information networks which the public can trust. One element of assuring such secure networks is a comprehensive legal framework to deter, identify, and prosecute attacks on them. (Kamal, 2005, p. 17) The globalization of technology, information networks, culture and communication has dramatically changed the relationship between law and society. As Johnson & Post (1996, p. 2) point out when discussing the rise of law in cyberspace, 'territorially based law-making and law-enforcing authorities find this new environment deeply threatening'. The rapid technological and social changes along with the globalization of digital communication and media have produced socio-technological/legal dilemmas that are difficult to handle from a legal point of view. New conditions that require regulation emerge for which there are no or only inadequate traditional norms on which to base such regulation.
These dilemmas notwithstanding, western nations have struggled with the legal regulation of cyberhate and extremism online. In many cases, existing legislation has been invoked, as in the case of defamation laws, incitement to hatred policies, and human rights legislation. Bailey (2006) urges the innovative application of intellectual property law, libel law, and even the filing of union grievances in work places (e.g. libraries) that are exposed to online hate. More broadly, however, scholars and activists point to the necessity of international initiatives and the global harmonization of laws in order to effectively address hate crime. As mentioned earlier, cyberhate knows no boundaries; its perpetrators are anonymous and fluid; its messages globally available. Any single nation is powerless to battle the movement on its own. Only by sharing resources and regulatory strategies and personnel can they make inroads to curb cyberhate. Given the value that western nations tend to place on freedom of speech and expression, it is unrealistic to expect or ask for the legal wherewithal to eliminate it by executive fiat. This goal must be attained by other means.
The law is not the only -or perhaps even the most effective -weapon available to counter cyberhate. Bailey (2006) suggests four key mechanisms that can supplement legal intervention. The first of these is the simplest, and is especially useful in protecting children and specific contexts from hate speech. This is filtering, which allows the prevention of specified content from accessibility. Of course, such individual responses are very narrow in their impact. Nonetheless, it represents an attempt to reclaim 'ownership' and control of the web. A related exercise -not noted by Bailey -would have 'antagonists' engaging with the hate movement online. Zickmund (1997) draws attention to the 'dance' between racists and anti-racists online, where by the latter facilitate an 'ideological dialectic' (Zickmund, 1997, p. 200) . While this could represent an important challenge to the uncontested hegemony of the racist subculture, Zickmund (1997, p. 203) in fact found the opposite: the common antagonists 'allow group members to counter-attack and to support their own peers'.
A second option -one that is widely used -is the development of monitoring organizations. Entities like the ADL, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center are powerful examples of this. Not only do they identify and 'count' hate sites; they also counter them with high profile educational campaigns. The Southern Poverty Law Center, in particular, has also had success in litigation directed against real world and cyberhate organizations.
Third among Bailey's (2006) suggestions is the use of hate speech hotlines, a slightly more passive means of monitoring online hate activity. Web users report hate sites and incidents of cyberhate, which may then be investigated and passed on to law enforcement or other authorities for official action. Finally, is ISP selfregulation, in which service providers assume the responsibility of cleaning up the Web. Canadian and German ISP organizations, for example, have developed codes of conduct for their members. It is not unheard of for ISPs to remove content, and in fact shut down sites, typically in response to public complaints or the actions of antiracist advocates. Of course, this too, raises the spectre of censorship, which is such anathema to free speech advocates.
These are not either/or efforts. As with unilateral legal efforts, isolated countervailing initiatives are decidedly limited in their impact. Consequently, legal, regulatory, monitoring, educative, and individual anti-oppressive activities must be co-terminous. Individually, we cannot abdicate responsibility to the state, the industry, or to anti-racist organizations. And nor should they abdicate whatever level of responsibility is within their realm. Indeed, as Bailey (2006, p. 58) concludes in her article, 'broad-based efforts involving strategic alliances among citizens, citizen coalitions, industry and government provide a strong foundation from which to engage in visible, publicly accountable action against cyberhate.'
Concluding remarks
The Internet culture is both complicated and multi-faceted to understand since many users and producers believe that the Internet should remain a 'free-zone' where no governmental regulation or laws should apply. Others believe that existing laws are sufficient and can be effectively applied to the cyberspace environment. In this paper we have argued that the expansion of information technology and the Internet has facilitated the ability of cyberhate groups and other extremist groups to disseminate their message in a medium that is to a large extent uncontrolled. The Internet allows the hate movement to retrench and reinvent itself as a viable collective through the many electronic means available to this movement.
Extreme points of views will continue to be expressed in the future whether it is in web based communities or in real life communities. The core of the problem does not lie in whether these extreme points of views are facilitated or disseminated through information technology or not. The core of the problem lies in how the local, regional or the global society will respond to it if the extreme points of views violate the rights of individuals or collectives.
The increasing problem of cyberhate has many similarities to the field of cybercrime. The expanding problem of cybercrime has not only started to transform the legal landscape and jurisdiction but it has also addressed the problem of online security and is to a large extent driven by economic and legal incentives. The Internet and other virtual communities where people are allowed to interact through information technology will continue to reflect honorable and dishonorable, good and bad elements from the real society.
